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WINNER, BEST APPELLATE BRIEF IN THE 2016 NATIVE 
AMERICAN LAW STUDENT ASSOCIATION MOOT COURT 
COMPETITION 
Ashley Akers* & Maureen Orth** 
Questions Presented 
I. Whether Michiconsin retains Public Law 280 jurisdiction to keep 
peace across the state and enforce a criminal prohibition of cannabis against 
the M-A Nation given that the Secretary of the Interior never accepted 
retrocession pursuant to federal procedures. 
II. Whether The High End Hotel is entitled to sovereign immunity even 
though it serves merely business purposes and if not, whether Michiconsin 
state courts have jurisdiction to apply common law tort doctrine given the 
state’s strong interest in providing recourse for tort victims. 
Statement of the Case 
I. Statement of Facts 
This case is about preserving peace and safety across the state of 
Michiconsin by permitting Michiconsin to apply its criminal law to illegal 
behavior on the M-A Nation reservation and allowing tort victims to 
recover after being exposed to highly carcinogenic toxins. The M-A Nation 
is a federally recognized Indian tribe in the state of Michiconsin. R. at 1. In 
1965, Michiconsin assumed jurisdiction to the fullest extent possible over 
Indian country within its borders pursuant to Section 7 of Public Law 280 
(Pub. L. 280). R. at 1. Pub. L. 280 is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162 and 
grants state jurisdiction over offenses “committed by or against Indians in 
the areas of Indian country.” 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (2012). Thus, the criminal 
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laws of Michiconsin have had the same “force and effect” within the M-A 
Nation’s territory as they have elsewhere in the state since Michiconsin 
assumed full jurisdiction in 1965. See id.; R. at 1. This includes 
Michiconsin criminal statutes MCL 5.43 and 4.20. See R. at 2. The Grant 
County Sheriff’s Office has been and continues to be responsible for 
providing law enforcement for the M-A Nation. R. at 1. 
In 2000, after the Michiconsin legislature declined to retrocede its 
jurisdiction over the M-A Nation’s reservation, the Michiconsin Governor 
issued a proclamation retroceding the jurisdiction Michiconsin assumed in 
1965 pursuant to Pub. L. 280. R. at 1. The proclamation was delivered to 
the U.S. Department of the Interior, but no official acceptance by the 
Secretary of the Interior was issued. R. at 1. After seven years of repeated 
inquiries, the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs advised the M-A Nation 
to treat the Secretary’s inaction as acquiescence of the retrocession, though, 
to date, the Secretary of the Interior has yet to formally accept the 
retrocession. R. at 1. The Tribe received a grant to support development of 
its own court and law enforcement capacity, but the local country sheriff 
has continued to assert criminal jurisdiction and protect peace on the 
reservation. R at 1. In fact, the sheriff has made several public statements 
claiming jurisdiction over the M-A Nation reservation. R. at 1. This 
includes enforcing MCL 5.43 and 4.20 against the M-A Nation 
corporation’s officers, and its Tribal Council, who violated the Michiconsin 
laws by cultivating and selling high-tetrahydrocannabinol (high THC) 
marijuana at The High End Hotel. R. at 2.  
Under Michiconsin law, the cultivation, sale, or distribution of any part 
of the cannabis plant in Michiconsin is considered a felony and carries a 
$10,000 fine with up to five years of imprisonment. R. at 2; see also MCL 
5.43. The Hemp Development Act, codified in MCL 4.20, permits the 
cultivation of low THC cannabis (hemp) in very limited circumstances. R. 
at 2. First, only higher education institutions may receive state authorization 
to cultivate hemp. R. at 2. Second, institutions may cultivate hemp only 
insofar as it is necessary for an agricultural pilot program or academic 
research regarding the growth, cultivation, or marketing of industrial hemp. 
R. at 2. Neither of these narrow exceptions permitting the cultivation of 
hemp are present in this case. As a general matter, cultivating industrial 
hemp is prohibited in Michiconsin under MCL 4.20 and violators are 
subject to criminal penalties. R. at 2. Penalties for violating the Hemp 
Development Act include “a penalty of up to $10,000 and up to two years 
imprisonment.” R. at 2.  
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The M-A Nation is the sole owner of a section 17 economic development 
corporation chartered under the Indian Reorganization Act. R. at 2. The 
corporation is informally referred to as the MAIN EDC and owns several 
enterprises located on trust land in the M-A reservation, including a 
commercial fishery, hotel and restaurant, saw mill, four gas stations and 
convenience stores, and a 5,000 acre farm. R. at 2. In 2014, the MAIN EDC 
incorporated a new entity named “The High End Hotel.” R. at 3.  
The Tribal Council and the MAIN EDC officers violated both MCL 5.43 
and 4.20 when they cultivated, distributed, processed, produced, 
manufactured, and sold cannabis products at The High End Hotel. R. at 3. 
After The High End Hotel initiated its illegal cannabis operation, the Grant 
County Sherriff’s office conducted a raid of the hotel and seized 500 
cannabis plants and seventy-five pounds of processed marijuana. R. at 3. 
The Grant County prosecutor charged the M-A Tribal Council and officers 
of the MAIN EDC for violating MCL 5.43 and 4.20. R. at 3.  
During the seizure of the cannabis plants and processed marijuana, 
Charles Taylor, a local Grant County law enforcement officer, burned the 
cannabis in compliance with his official law enforcement duties. R. at 4. 
After burning the cannabis, Officer Taylor suffered injuries from inhalation 
of the highly carcinogenic pesticides used by The High End Hotel in the 
cultivation of the cannabis, including burns and ulcerations of the mouth, 
stomach, and lower GI tract. R. at 4. Only after Officer Taylor suffered 
these injures did the Michiconsin State Attorney General’s office discover 
the highly carcinogenic toxins came from a pesticide. R. at 4. 
To recover against The High End Hotel for its tortious use of a pesticide 
containing highly carcinogenic toxins, the Michiconsin State Attorney 
General filed a tort claim in Michiconsin state court against The High End 
Hotel. R. at 4. The claim was filed on behalf of Officer Taylor and all of the 
state residents who experienced injury after burning the cannabis and being 
exposed to highly carcinogenic toxins. R. at 4. 
II. Statement of Proceedings 
In the criminal trial against the M-A Tribal Council and the MAIN EDC 
officers, the Grant County Court found that Michiconsin had criminal 
jurisdiction over the defendants for cultivating, selling, and distributing 
cannabis in violation of MCL 5.43 and 4.20, and concluded the defendants 
were guilty under both statutes. R. at 3. All of the defendants received the 
maximum sentence. R. at 3. The Michiconsin Court of Appeals and the 
State of Michiconsin Supreme Court affirmed the decision. R. at 3. The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide two issues: (1) 
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whether the state of Michiconsin has criminal jurisdiction over the actions 
of the M-A Tribal Council and MAIN EDC officers within the M-A 
Nation’s Indian Country; and (2) if the state of Michiconsin has criminal 
jurisdiction over the defendants, whether prosecution of the defendants 
under MCL 5.43 and 4.20 is nevertheless barred as an impermissible 
exercise of civil regulatory jurisdiction over the defendants. R. at 3.  
Before hearing the merits of the State Attorney General’s tort case 
against The High End Hotel, the Michiconsin state court dismissed the case 
on the theory that the M-A Nation’s tribal sovereign immunity applied to 
The High End Hotel. R. at 4. The court also noted that Michiconsin lacked 
jurisdiction to apply its state common law tort doctrine to the on-reservation 
activities of the MAIN EDC. R. at 4. The Michiconsin State Attorney 
General appealed the ruling and both the Michiconsin Court of Appeals and 
the State of Michiconsin Supreme Court affirmed. R. at 4. The United 
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide two issues: (1) whether 
The High End Hotel has sovereign immunity thereby depriving 
Michiconsin courts of jurisdiction over the case; and (2) if The High End 
Hotel does not enjoy sovereign immunity, whether Michiconsin state courts 
have jurisdiction to apply state common law tort doctrine to the MAIN 
EDC’s on-reservation activities. R. at 4.  
Summary of Argument 
This case is about ensuring the safety of residents across the state of 
Michiconsin. The state asserts valid criminal jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280 
to enforce MCL 5.43 and 4.20 over the M-A Nation to protect its residents 
and prohibit the manufacturing, distribution, and sale of cannabis. 
Furthermore, the state seeks to hold The High End Hotel accountable to law 
enforcement officer Charles Taylor and state residents who experienced 
injury from breathing highly carcinogenic toxins elicited by the burning of 
cannabis manufactured on the M-A Nation’s reservation.  
Michiconsin retains jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280 to enforce MCL 5.43 
and 4.20 against the MAIN EDC and the M-A Tribal Council because 
specific federal procedures for retrocession have not been met. Retrocession 
of Pub. L. 280 jurisdiction is a federal question. See Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 
F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976), rev’d on other grounds, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
The federal government has outlined specific procedures for state 
retrocession of Pub. L. 280 jurisdiction. See Exec. Order No. 11,435, 33 
Fed. Reg. 1739. For example, the Secretary of the Interior must formally 
accept the retrocession. Until the specific federal procedures have been met, 
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Michiconsin retains Pub. L. 280 jurisdiction. In this case, the Secretary of 
the Interior has not accepted Michiconsin retrocession and therefore 
Michiconsin retains authority to enforce its criminal laws over the M-A 
Nation.  
MCL 5.43 and 4.20 are criminal laws because, as a general matter, they 
prohibit, and do not regulate, the manufacturing, distribution, and sale of 
cannabis. Even if, however, the Court finds that Pub. L. 280 jurisdiction has 
been retroceded or that MCL 5.43 and 4.20 are regulatory, Michiconsin has 
jurisdiction to enforce MCL 5.43 and 4.20 because state law is neither pre-
empted by federal law nor inconsistent with tribal interests reflected in 
federal law. Additionally, state interest in protecting its citizens from the 
harmful effects of cannabis and ensuring safety across the state outweighs 
tribal interest in raising revenue because the Tribe is engaged in several 
profitable enterprises. 
In addition to having jurisdiction to enforce MCL 5.43 and 4.20, the 
Michiconsin State Attorney General can bring a tort action against The 
High End Hotel for its tortious conduct in exposing law enforcement 
personnel and state residents to highly carcinogenic toxins. The High End 
Hotel does not enjoy tribal sovereign immunity because it is not an arm of 
the M-A Nation; it functions solely as a profit-making enterprise seeking to 
capitalize in an otherwise illegal market. Furthermore, the policies of 
sovereign immunity are not served when this immunity is extended to 
protect a corporate entity from its freely assumed enterprises. Lastly, 
sovereign immunity should not protect corporate entities in tort cases 
because injured victims will be left without recourse.  
Because The High End Hotel does not enjoy tribal sovereign immunity, 
the State Attorney General can bring a tort action against the hotel and 
Michiconsin state courts have jurisdiction to apply its common law tort 
doctrine. Michiconsin common law tort doctrine is generally applicable 
because regulating tort cases is in the purview of state governance. 
Furthermore, Michiconsin common law tort doctrine is not pre-empted by 
federal law and does not infringe on tribal interests of self-determination or 
self-government reflected in federal law. Lastly, Michiconsin has a strong 
interest in providing recourse to state residents that were victimized after 
being exposed to highly carcinogenic toxins in Michiconsin because of The 
High End Hotel’s tortious conduct.  
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I. Michiconsin has criminal jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280 to enforce its 
criminal laws over the M-A Nation including MCL 5.43 and 4.20. 
Michiconsin retains the jurisdiction it assumed under Pub. L. 280 over 
the M-A Nation in 1965. Michiconsin retains criminal jurisdiction to 
enforce MCL 5.43 and 4.20 because the Secretary of the Interior has not 
accepted Michiconsin’s retrocession of Pub. L. 280. Because retrocession is 
a federal question, until the specific federal procedures for retrocession 
have been met Michiconsin may enforce its criminal laws over the M-A 
Nation. 
Additionally, Michiconsin properly exercised jurisdiction in charging the 
M-A Tribal Council and MAIN EDC officers for violating MCL 5.43 and 
4.20. Enforcing MCL 5.43 and 4.20 represents a permissible exercise of 
criminal jurisdiction under Pub. L. 280 because the laws are primarily 
prohibitory, not regulatory, in nature. Finally, even if the Court finds that 
Pub. L. 280 jurisdiction has been retroceded or that MCL 5.43 and 4.20 are 
regulatory, the state has jurisdiction to regulate the M-A Nation through 
MCL 5.43 and 4.20 because the state law is not pre-empted by federal law 
and state interest in ensuring law and order across Michiconsin outweighs 
tribal interest in selling cannabis.  
A. Pub. L. 280 retrocession is a federal question. 
Congress alone has plenary and exclusive power over Indian affairs. 
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 
439 U.S. 463, 470 (1979). Thus, when “Congress has expressly provided,” 
state laws are “applied to tribal Indians on their reservations.” California v. 
Cabazon Band of Miss. Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 207, 214 (1987). By 
enacting Pub. L. 280, Congress expressly provided “federal consent” to 
state assumption of criminal jurisdiction over Indian country. Three 
Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g, 476 U.S. 877, 
879 (1986). 
When enacting Pub. L. 280, Congress outlined specific procedures for 
states to assume jurisdiction over Indian country and outlined how states 
may later petition the federal government to accept retrocession of 
jurisdiction. Id.; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1323 (2012). Therefore, retrocession 
is a question of federal law involving specific federal procedures and 
federal considerations. See Oliphant, 544 F.2d at 1007. Because the federal 
government has not accepted retrocession of Michiconsin’s jurisdiction 
pursuant to the federal procedures, the state retains criminal jurisdiction 
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over the M-A Nation’s Indian country to enforce MCL 5.43 and 4.20 and 
preserve peace throughout the state. 
1. The federal procedures for Pub. L. 280 retrocession have not been 
met.  
Because the Secretary of the Interior has yet to accept Michiconsin’s 
proclamation of retrocession, Michiconsin retains criminal jurisdiction over 
the M-A Nation’s Indian country. Congress authorized states to retrocede 
Pub. L. 280 jurisdiction by petitioning the Secretary of the Interior. See 25 
U.S.C. § 1323; see also Exec. Order No. 11,435, 33 Fed. Reg. 1739. 
Furthermore, the Secretary must consult with the Attorney General before 
accepting retrocession and then publish retrocession in the federal register. 
See Exec. Order No. 11435, 33 Fed. Reg. 1739. Therefore, a state retains 
criminal jurisdiction over Indian country pursuant to Pub. L. 280 until the 
Secretary of the Interior consults with the Attorney General, accepts the 
retrocession, and publishes notice of retrocession in the federal register. See 
United States v. Lawrence, 595 F.2d 1149, 1151 (1979) (describing how the 
Secretary of the Interior accepted the retrocession proclamation of the 
Governor of Washington).  
Key to these procedures is the fact that nothing in § 1323 nor Executive 
Order 11435 requires the Secretary to accept retrocession. See Exec. Order 
No. 11,435, 33 Fed. Reg. 1739; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1323. Instead, the 
Secretary of the Interior will consult with the Attorney General about 
several important considerations to decide whether to transfer jurisdiction 
from the enforcing state back to the federal government. See Exec. Order 
No. 11,435, 33 Fed. Reg. 1739. The Secretary of the Interior will consider 
factors such as whether the Native council is prepared to exercise effective 
jurisdiction, and whether the Tribe has satisfactory law enforcement 
provisions in place to manage additional peace-keeping responsibilities. See 
File No. 366-131-861985 WL 70193, at *1 (Alaska A.G. Oct. 16, 1985) 
(explaining the Secretary of the Interior’s considerations for accepting 
retrocession). In other words, the Secretary of Interior’s acceptance of 
retrocession is not merely a formality, but a careful consideration of federal, 
state, and tribal interests in law and order that cannot be passed over or 
“acquiesced by silence” as the M-A Nation asserts.  
Although the Michiconsin governor issued a proclamation retroceding 
jurisdiction from the state back to the federal government, the proclamation 
was never accepted by the Secretary of the Interior. The Secretary of the 
Interior never consulted with the Attorney General nor weighed the 
important considerations of transferring jurisdiction. After seven years of 
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silence from the Department, the only notice the M-A Nation received was 
from the Assistant Secretary for Indian Affairs, not the Secretary of the 
Interior. The Assistant Secretary directed the Tribe to treat the 
Department’s inaction as acquiescence, yet the Secretary never formally 
accepted retrocession nor published retrocession in the federal register. 
Therefore, Michiconsin has continued to properly assert criminal 
jurisdiction over the M-A Nation’s Indian country and to preserve peace 
across the state. 
2. Michiconsin retains jurisdiction consistent with federal policy. 
Pub. L. 280 and its subsequent amendments represent specific concerns 
and considerations for the balance of federal, tribal, and state interests. 
According to this Court in Yakima, Pub. L. 280 reflects Congressional 
concern over “law-and-order problems” in Indian country as well as 
“financial burdens” associated with federal jurisdictional responsibilities on 
Indian lands. Yakima, 439 U.S. at 488. Therefore, at the outset, Pub. L. 280 
“was intended to facilitate, not to impede, the transfer of jurisdictional 
responsibility to the states.” Id. at 490.  
Congress’s policy toward Indian tribes is now one of self-determination 
and self-government, as reflected in Congress’s amendments to Pub. L. 
280. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216. Since 1968, Congress has required 
consent from tribes before a state may assume jurisdiction. See Kennerly v. 
Dist. Court of Ninth Judicial Dist. of Mont., 400 U.S. 423, 425 (1971). 
Additionally, in 1968, Congress provided specific provisions for 
retrocession of state jurisdiction. See Three Affiliated Tribes, 476 U.S. at 
877. But Congress has created no retrocession provision for states that 
assumed jurisdiction after 1968. See id. Congress recognized no need for 
retrocession in instances where jurisdiction was lawful to the extent it was 
“consistent with Indian tribal sovereignty and self-government.” Id. at 877. 
To strike a balance between tribal self-government and law and order, 
the federal government provided very specific provisions for retroceding 
jurisdiction assumed prior to 1968—this includes Michiconsin. See id. 
These retrocession provisions reflect Congress’s policy toward self-
determination and self-government by providing specific procedures that 
account for concerns over law and order in Indian country. Therefore, the 
Secretary of the Interior will accept retrocession only after specifically 
considering the interests of the tribe, state, and federal government in 
transferring state jurisdiction. See File No. 366-131-861985 WL 70193, at 
*1 (Alaska A.G. Oct. 16, 1985) (explaining the Secretary of the Interior’s 
considerations for accepting retrocession).  
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As of this time, the only action taken toward Michiconsin’s retrocession 
of Pub. L. 280 jurisdiction is the Michiconsin Governor’s proclamation. 
The Secretary of the Interior has remained silent. The specific federal 
considerations that protect the balance of “law and order” as well as “tribal 
self-determination” have not been taken into account. While the M-A 
Nation may have received a grant to improve their tribal court and law 
enforcement capacity, it is up to the Secretary of the Interior to determine 
whether the Tribe is prepared to assume full jurisdiction with no state 
assistance. Yet the Department of the Interior has merely instructed the 
Tribe to treat silence as “acquiescence.” Recognizing retrocession where 
the Secretary of the Interior has not formally accepted state retrocession 
runs afoul of Congressional interests. Without ensuring that a tribe is 
equipped to enforce law and order on its own, there is a risk that tribal law 
enforcement will be unsuccessful. Therefore, recognizing retrocession 
without following federal procedure undermines, rather than promotes, 
Congress’s policy of tribal self-determination and self-government.  
B. Michiconsin properly enforced MCL 5.43 and 4.20. 
Because MCL 5.43 and 4.20 are criminal, prohibitory laws, Michiconsin 
properly prosecuted the M-A Tribal Council and the MAIN EDC officers. 
MCL 5.43 and 4.20 are criminal because they prohibit, rather than regulate, 
the cultivation, sale, and distribution of any part of the cannabis plant. 
Additionally, even if the Court finds that Pub. L. 280 jurisdiction has been 
retroceded or that MCL 5.43 and 4.20 are regulatory, MCL 5.43 and 4.20 
still apply in this case. MCL 5.43 and 4.20 apply because state law is not 
pre-empted by federal law and state interests in preventing drug trafficking 
across the state outweighs any tribal interest at stake.  
1. MCL 5.43 and 4.20 are criminal laws and thus enforceable.  
The first step in determining whether a state law applies under Pub. L. 
280 is to determine whether the law is “criminal/prohibitory” in nature. 
Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 209. The Court distinguished between 
“criminal/prohibitory” and “civil/regulatory” in Cabazon. Id. If the state 
law generally “prohibit[s] certain conduct,” then it falls within Pub. L. 
280’s “grant of criminal jurisdiction.” Id. The state law is civil/regulatory 
and falls outside the grant of criminal jurisdiction if the law “generally 
permits” the conduct at issue. Id.; see also Quechan Indian Tribe v. 
McMullen, 984 F.2d 304, 308 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that a law 
prohibiting dangerous fireworks except in the hands of licensed 
professionals was criminal/prohibitory in nature). 
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Here, there is little question that MCL 5.43 is criminal/prohibitory in 
nature because it prohibits the cultivation, sale, and distribution of any 
amount of cannabis in Michiconsin. The violation of MCL 5.43 is 
considered a felony and carries a $10,000 fine with up to five years 
imprisonment. 
Similarly, the Hemp Development Act generally prohibits all cultivation 
of cannabis and thus MCL 4.20 is also prohibitive in nature. Michiconsin 
prohibits cultivation of all hemp except in two limited circumstances. First, 
Michiconsin only authorizes higher institutions to cultivate industrial hemp. 
See MCL 4.20. Second, the cultivation must be necessary for an agricultural 
pilot program or academic research. See id. This is a marked contrast from 
the regulatory law at issue in Cabazon. 
In Cabazon, the Court found a law was civil/regulatory in nature because 
the state, as a general matter, encouraged the conduct at issue. See Cabazon, 
480 U.S. at 210. California sought to enforce a state regulatory law that 
permitted bingo games as long as they were operated by charitable 
organizations. Id. at 205. Key to the Court’s holding in Cabazon was that 
California by no means prohibited all forms of gambling—in fact, 
California promoted and encouraged its citizens to participate in a state 
lottery. Id. at 210. Additionally, the Court found that although California 
prohibited some forms of gambling, many forms of unenumerated games 
were permissible and operated in facilities statewide. Id. Finally, California 
did not make any effort to forbid playing bingo by anyone over eighteen 
years old. Id. at 211. Thus, the Court concluded that the California statute 
regulated, rather than prohibited, bingo. Id. 
In direct contrast, Michiconsin prohibits all cultivation of hemp and 
cannabis through MCL 5.43 and 4.20. Michiconsin in no way promotes or 
encourages its citizens to cultivate or use hemp or cannabis because the 
cultivation or sale of any amount of cannabis carries a $10,000 fine and up 
to ten years imprisonment. The cultivation of low-THC cannabis, or hemp, 
is only permissible in limited circumstances by higher education institutions 
as part of agricultural research. Additionally, even institutions require 
specific state authorization to ensure cultivation is associated with 
agricultural growth, cultivation, or marketing research and there is no 
higher education research present here. Therefore, while California 
generally permitted bingo but regulated it in limited circumstances, here, 
Michiconsin generally prohibits all cultivation and use of cannabis except 
in very limited circumstances, none of which are applicable here. 
Therefore, MCL 5.43 and 4.20 are criminal/prohibitory in nature and 
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Michiconsin had proper jurisdiction to apply the laws to the M-A Tribal 
Council and MAIN EDC officers under Pub. L. 280. 
2. State law applies even if the Court finds Pub. L. 280 jurisdiction has 
been retroceded or that MCL 5.43 and 4.20 are regulatory. 
There is no per se rule precluding state jurisdiction over tribes and tribal 
members absent congressional consent. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215. In fact, a 
state may validly assert authority over a tribe and tribal members provided 
state law is not pre-empted by federal law and is not incompatible with 
federal law and policy toward tribal interests. See id. at 216. Even if state 
law is incompatible, the Court will consider whether the state interests at 
stake are sufficient to justify the assertion of state authority. Id. (citing 
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 333 (1983)). Therefore, 
even if the Court finds that Pub. L. 280 jurisdiction has been retroceded or 
that MCL 5.43 and 4.20 are regulatory, Michiconsin properly enforced 
MCL 5.43 and 4.20 against the MAIN EDC officers and Tribal Council.  
a) Michiconsin law is not pre-empted by federal law or tribal interests. 
Recent cases have established a trend “away from the idea of inherent 
Indian sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on 
federal pre-emption.” Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 718 (1983) (quoting 
McClanahan v. Ariz. State Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). In its 
pre-emption analysis, the Court does not require that Congress “explicitly 
pre-empt assertion of state authority” in Indian Country. Rice, 463 U.S. at 
719. Instead, the Court recognizes that any applicable state regulatory 
interest “must be given weight” against a “backdrop” of tribal sovereignty. 
Id. Additionally, if the Court finds that the balance of state, federal, and 
tribal interests “so requires,” the backdrop of tribal sovereignty should be 
given less weight. Id. at 720. 
In the record, there is no evidence that Michiconsin state law is 
preempted by federal law. In fact, Michiconsin law is consistent with 
federal law because cannabis is illegal under both. 21 U.S.C. § 812, § 841 
(2012) (stating that marijuana is a Schedule I controlled substance and it is 
illegal under federal law to manufacture or distribute). Therefore, the 
inquiry becomes whether the state law is compatible with federal and tribal 
interests reflected in federal law, “unless the state interests at stake are 
sufficient to justify assertion of state authority.” Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216.  
Through its pre-emption analysis, the Court weighs the congressional 
goal of Indian self-government against state interests in asserting authority. 
See id. Congress’s “overriding goal” is encouraging tribal self-sufficiency 
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and economic development. Id. (quoting New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache 
Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 335 (1983)). Here, however, there are no federal 
interests in supporting tribal self-government or economic development that 
outweigh Michiconsin’s interests in preventing the cultivation of cannabis 
because the Tribe has numerous ways to raise revenue.  
In Cabazon, the Court found that state interest in regulating bingo did 
not justify applying state law to the Tribe. Yet key to the Court’s holding 
was federal governmental approval of tribal gaming and the lack of other 
means the Tribe had to raise revenue. See id. at 219. The situation here is 
markedly different; not only is there no evidence that the federal 
government approves of the cultivation, distribution, or sale of cannabis, 
there is also nothing to suggest that selling cannabis is the Tribe’s only way 
to raise revenue. See 21 U.S.C. § 812, § 841. The MAIN EDC owns several 
enterprises including a commercial fishery, hotel and restaurant, saw mill, 
four gas stations and convenience stores, and a 5,000 acre farm. Given the 
numerous profit bearing enterprises of the M-A Nation, selling cannabis is 
not necessary for the Tribe to raise revenue and thus not essential to Indian 
self-government. 
b) State interest necessitates regulation. 
Even if the Court finds some tribal interests in self-sufficiency are at 
stake, the Court will also consider whether state interests at issue justify 
assertion of authority. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216. The Court has 
recognized that “[w]hen . . . state interests outside the reservation are 
implicated, States may regulate the activities even of tribe members on 
tribal land. . . .” Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 362 (2001); see also 
Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216 (quoting Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 
333).  
In Rice, the Court justified state jurisdiction over on-reservation liquor 
sales because of state interests in inevitable “spillover.” See 463 U.S. at 
724. The Court recognized that the unique off-reservation effects of liquor 
sales, such as alcoholic beverages making their way into the hands of those 
whom the state did not wish to have alcoholic beverages, necessitated state 
jurisdiction. See id. 
Similarly, here cannabis sales present unique spillover risks which 
necessitate Michiconsin jurisdiction. Michiconsin has tremendous interest 
in preventing the cultivation, distribution, and sale of cannabis within its 
borders. Drug cultivation and distribution brings increased rates of crime 
and gang related activity. See Hearing on Addressing the Harmful Effects of 
Dangerous Drugs in Native Communities Before the United States Sen. 
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Committee on Indian Affairs (Mar. 31, 2015) (Testimony of Darren Cruzan, 
Director, Office of Justice Services, Bureau of Indian Affairs). When drugs 
are cultivated, manufactured, and sold on the reservation, the effects are felt 
across Michiconsin as smugglers attempt to capitalize on the burgeoning 
reservation drug market where cannabis is otherwise illegal. The Court 
must recognize that the MAIN EDC’s activity stands to have a substantial 
impact beyond the reservation. State interest in preserving peace and safety 
across Michiconsin justifies state authority in regulating cannabis in the M-
A Nation. Accordingly, the decision of the Supreme Court of Michiconsin 
should be affirmed. 
II. Michiconsin’s claim against The High End Hotel is not barred by tribal 
sovereign immunity and Michiconsin state courts have jurisdiction to apply 
its state common law tort doctrine. 
The Michiconsin state court should reach the merits of Michiconsin v. 
The High End Hotel because The High End Hotel does not enjoy the M-A 
Nation’s tribal sovereign immunity. The High End Hotel is an entity legally 
distinct from the Tribe. Sovereign immunity does not protect The High End 
Hotel from its tortious conduct because it is not an arm of the M-A Nation, 
the policies of sovereign immunity are not served in this case, and 
sovereign immunity should not protect entities in tort cases. Thus, The High 
End Hotel should be held accountable for its actions including liability for 
exposing a state officer and state residents to highly carcinogenic toxins.  
Furthermore, Michiconsin has jurisdiction to apply its state common law 
tort doctrine. When a state assumes adjudicatory jurisdiction over a case 
involving non-Indians and an Indian entity, it may apply its own law so 
long as it is not pre-empted by federal law or by tribal interests of self-
determination and self-government reflected in federal law. See Rice, 463 
U.S. at 718. Here, state common law tort doctrine is not pre-empted by 
either. Furthermore, Michiconsin has a substantial interest in protecting 
citizens across the state from the effects of The High End Hotel’s dangerous 
enterprise.  
A. The High End Hotel does not enjoy tribal sovereign immunity. 
Tribal immunity is “settled law” and an important protection of Indian 
sovereignty. See Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 756 (1998). Yet 
it was “developed almost by accident” and is not limitless. Id. For example, 
this Court has “never held that corporations affiliated with an Indian tribe 
have sovereign immunity.” Sue/Perior Concrete & Paving, Inc. v. Lewiston 
Golf Course Corp., 24 N.Y.3d 538, 548 (2014). As such, this Court has yet 
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to articulate a test indicating when, if ever, corporations share in tribal 
immunity. Furthermore, while it is within Congress’s plenary power to 
abrogate sovereign immunity of a tribe, see Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2031, 
“[i]t is clear from the cases involving tribal entities that such entities have 
no inherent immunity of their own.” Am. Prop. Mgmt. Corp. v. Superior 
Court, 206 Cal. App. 4th 491, 500 (2012) (quoting Trudgeon v. Fantasy 
Springs Casino 71 Cal. App. 4th 632, 639 (1999)). 
1. The High End Hotel is not an “arm of the tribe.” 
A tribal entity only enjoys tribal immunity if it serves as an “arm” of the 
tribe. See, e.g., Inyo Cty. v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of Bishop Cmty. of the 
Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701, 705 fn. 1 (2003); Breakthrough Mgmt. Group 
v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 1173, 1181 (10th Cir. 2010) 
(explaining that “[t]ribal sovereign immunity may extend to subdivisions of 
a tribe . . . provided that the relationship between the tribe and the entity is 
sufficiently close”). When determining whether an entity is an arm of the 
tribe, lower courts consider the following factors: whether the corporation 
was formed “solely for business purposes and without any declared 
objective of promoting the [tribe’s] general tribal or economic 
development,” Breakthrough Mgmt., 629 F.3d at 1181 (quoting Trudgeon v. 
Fantasy Springs Casino, 71 Cal. App. 4th 632,640 (1999)), the “tribal 
involvement in the creation and control of the entity, tribal intent to clothe 
the entity with immunity, and [consideration of] whether the entity serves 
tribal sovereign interests.” See Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian 
Law, § 7.05(1)(a) (2005 ed.); see also Allen v. Gold Country Casino, 464 
F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2006); Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 
F.3d 1040 (8th Cir. 2000). Although lower courts have extended tribal 
immunity to some tribal entities, The High End Hotel is distinguishable in 
many regards.  
Entities that operate solely for a business purpose are not an arm of the 
tribe and therefore do not enjoy tribal sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Dixon 
v. Picopa Constr. Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1111 (Ariz. 1989) (finding a 
corporation has no sovereign immunity because there was no proof it was 
created to conduct tribal business); Breakthrough Mgmt., 629 F.3d at 1184 
(explaining that entities with a distinct, non-governmental character are not 
immune from suit). Entities are only protected by tribal sovereign immunity 
when the entity furthers “governmental objectives, such as providing 
housing, health and welfare services.” Ransom v. St. Regis Mohawk Educ. 
& Comm. Fund, 86 N.Y.2d 553, 558-59 (N.Y. 1995). The operation of The 
High End Hotel and its cannabis distribution center is not within the ambit 
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of a governmental objective or purpose. The dangerous properties of the 
cannabis do not further the health or welfare of the Tribe. Therefore, rather 
than promoting governmental objectives like health, welfare and housing, 
The High End Hotel is merely a corporation capitalizing on a quasi-
criminal industry.  
Because tribal governments often participate in commercial activities 
more so than other governments, the extent of tribal control over a 
corporation is indicative of whether it is an arm of the tribe. See 
Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1181. The High End Hotel is two steps removed 
from the tribe; it is a subsidiary of a Section 17 economic development 
corporation. The creation of an economic development corporation and its 
subsidiary are affirmative steps to distinguish the corporation from the 
tribe. Thus, the connection, and the extent to which the M-A Nation 
controls The High End Hotel, is attenuated. Furthermore, there are no facts 
in the record to suggest the M-A Nation intended The High End Hotel to 
share its immunity.  
If an entity does not possess attributes of tribal sovereignty, it should not 
enjoy the tribe’s immunity. Tribal sovereign interests include the ability to 
exercise sovereignty over its members and territory, the powers of self-
government over members of a tribe, and the power to exercise authority 
over non-Indians on reservation lands when their conduct affects the 
political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare of the tribe. See 
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 563 (1981). Here, the record is 
absent of any reference to improving the quality of life on the M-A Nation 
reservation. It can hardly be said that distributing a dangerous drug 
promotes the political, educational, or economic welfare of the Tribe, or 
preserves the cultural autonomy of the Tribe. In fact, because cultivating 
and distributing cannabis as a recreational drug stands to harm tribal 
members and non-members alike, distribution runs contrary to tribal 
interests. Therefore, because no evidence exists that The High End Hotel 
serves tribal sovereign interests as opposed to merely operating as a 
profitable cannabis business, it is not an arm of the Tribe and should not 
enjoy sovereign immunity. 
2. The policies of sovereign immunity are not served by extending 
immunity to The High End Hotel.  
In addition to identifying whether the entity is an arm of the tribe, courts 
consider the policies underlying sovereign immunity to determine whether 
those policies are served by extending sovereign immunity to tribal entities. 
See Dixon, 772 P.2d at 1111; Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216 (the inquiry into 
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sovereign immunity must “proceed in light of traditional notions of Indian 
sovereignty and the congressional goal of Indian self-government”). The 
purpose of tribal sovereign immunity is to serve as a “corollary to Indian 
sovereignty and self-governance.” Three Affiliated Tribes, 476 U.S. at 890. 
Therefore, if immunity is not critical to sovereignty and self-governance, 
then immunity should not apply.  
The sole purpose of incorporating The High End Hotel was to make 
money. It created a loophole to market and distribute cannabis that was 
otherwise illegal in Michiconsin. See MCL 5.43, 4.20. Nothing in the 
record suggests that The High End Hotel and its cannabis operation was 
initiated to promote, develop, or protect the Tribe’s sovereignty, culture, or 
ability to self-govern. Nothing suggests the M-A Nation’s self-
determination would be imperiled by declining to extend sovereign 
immunity to The High End Hotel. Although The High End Hotel 
presumably profited the M-A Nation to some extent, The High End Hotel is 
but one of many of the tribal corporations. See R. at 2 (the M-A Nation 
operates a commercial fishery, hotel, restaurant, saw mill, four gas stations 
and convenience stores, and a 5,000 acre farm).  
This is not a case about protecting the Tribe’s health, welfare, or cultural 
rights. This is a case involving a hotel trying to make a quick dollar in an 
otherwise impenetrable market. The High End Hotel is a business entity—
not a governmental entity and not an entity that needs protection from 
exposing innocent people to highly carcinogenic toxins. It is not enough to 
merely be incorporated under tribal law; the policies of sovereign immunity 
must be served before sovereign immunity is extended. Therefore, The 
High End Hotel should not be protected by the M-A Nation’s immunity 
because declining to extend tribal immunity in this case does not threaten 
the Tribe’s sovereignty or ability to self-govern. 
3. Sovereign immunity should not apply to tort claims. 
Finally, sovereign immunity should not extend to tribal entities in tort 
cases—particularly involving dangerous drug use—because it is inherently 
unjust to tort victims. See Three Affiliated Tribes, 476 U.S. at 890; Kiowa, 
523 U.S. at 758; Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2036. Tribal sovereign immunity 
harms tort victims “who have no opportunity to negotiate for a waiver” but 
come under its pretense by pure accident. Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 766 
(explaining tort victims are adversely affected by tribal immunity because 
those victims may be unaware they are dealing with the tribe, do not know 
of tribal immunity, or had no choice in the matter). In fact, many justices on 
this Court have noted that the justifications and rationales of sovereign 
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immunity do not support extending immunity to tort suits. See Bay Mills, 
134 S. Ct. at 2036; Kiowa, 523 U.S. at 758. This Court questioned whether 
“immunity should apply in the ordinary way if a tort victim . . . has no 
alternative way to obtain relief,” and explained that such a case would 
present a “‘special justification’ for abandoning [sovereign immunity] 
precedent.” Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2036, n.8. The doctrine of tribal 
immunity was intended to shield Indian tribes from exploitation by 
outsiders, but is not, and never has been, intended as a “sword tribes may 
wield to victimize outsiders.” Ex parte Poarch Band of Creek Indians, 155 
So. 3d 224, 230 (Ala. 2014); see also Matthew L.M. Fletcher, (Re)Solving 
the Tribal No-Forum Conundrum: Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian 
Community, 123 Yale L.J. Online 311, 314 (2013).  
This case illustrates the injustice of extending sovereign immunity to 
corporations in tort cases. The High End Hotel took advantage of its tribal 
status by obtaining a license to sell cannabis, an activity illegal for any 
other Michiconsin business. See MCL 5.43, 4.20. Already at an economic 
advantage, The High End Hotel incentivized non-Indians to travel onto the 
reservation, stay at its hotel, and purchase its cannabis by creating an island 
for an otherwise illegal product. In creating this island of illegality where 
state residents can purchase cannabis and take it elsewhere in the state, The 
High End Hotel exposed every state resident to carcinogenic toxins when 
the cannabis was burned. Only after the state residents were exposed to 
carcinogenic toxins did The High End Hotel move to dismiss the victims’ 
claims on the basis of sovereign immunity. The High End Hotel seeks all 
the benefits of its cannabis enterprise but none of the consequences. 
Extending immunity to a corporation two steps removed from the Tribe is 
improper because it fulfills none of the purposes of the doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity and leaves tort victims without recourse for their 
injuries. Therefore, sovereign immunity should not apply in this case.  
B. Michiconsin state court may apply its state common law tort doctrine 
to the MAIN EDC’s activities.  
Michiconsin state courts have adjudicatory jurisdiction over the case 
against The High End Hotel and have jurisdiction to apply its own common 
law to protect tort victims. State courts with contacts relevant to the suit and 
with a substantial interest in the case have adjudicatory jurisdiction over the 
case so long as tribal self-government is not affected. See, e.g., Fort Mojave 
Tribe v. Cty. of San Bernardino, 543 F.2d 1253, 1256 (9th Cir. 1976); Smith 
Plumbing Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 149 Ariz. 524, 519 (Ariz. 1986). 
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Not only does Michiconsin have jurisdiction to hear this case, its common 
law tort doctrine may be applied.  
There is no rigid rule “to resolve the question whether a particular state 
law may be applied to an Indian reservation or to tribal members.” White 
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980). In some 
cases, the exercise of state jurisdiction and application of state law has been 
limited to conduct occurring off reservations. See id. But this Court has 
made “repeated statements [] to the effect that, even on reservations, state 
laws may be applied.” Mescalero Apache Tribe, 411 U.S. at 148; 
Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 67-70 (1962); Hicks, 533 
U.S. at 362. In fact, this Court stated that “[w]hen . . . state interests outside 
the reservation are implicated, states may regulate the activities even of 
tribe members on tribal land.” Hicks, 533 U.S. at 362.  
Whether Michiconsin has jurisdiction to apply its own law turns on 
whether it is “pre-empted by the operation of federal law” or it “interferes 
or is incompatible with . . . tribal interests reflected in federal law. . . .” See 
Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 324. Even if state law is pre-empted, 
if the “state interests at stake are sufficient to justify” the application of 
state law, the state may do so. Id. In this case, Michiconsin may exercise 
jurisdiction to apply its common law tort doctrine over activity that took 
place on the M-A Nation’s reservation because state tort law is not pre-
empted by federal law or tribal interests reflected in federal law, and its 
application will not jeopardize the M-A Nation’s ability to self-govern. See 
White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 142. Furthermore, state interest 
in applying common law tort doctrine to injuries involving this dangerous 
recreational drug justifies assertion of state authority.  
1. Michiconsin has jurisdiction to hear this case. 
In cases involving Indian entities and non-Indians, the rights of both the 
tribe and the state are implicated. Although Indian tribes remain a separate 
people with power to make and enforce substantive laws in their own 
courts, see Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959), state courts also have 
adjudicatory jurisdiction to hear cases involving tribal entities where the 
state has a substantial interest. See, e.g., Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 
411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (state courts have jurisdiction to hear causes of action 
when, absent federal law to the contrary, the commercial activities of Indian 
entities go beyond reservation boundaries). In fact, “[t]ribal court is not 
always the appropriate forum for adjudicating occurrences on tribal land.” 
Smith Plumbing, 149 Ariz. at 529. As the “activity in question moves off 
the reservation the State’s governmental and regulatory interest increases 
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dramatically, and federal protectiveness of Indian sovereignty lessens.” Id. 
(holding an Arizona state court properly exercised adjudicatory jurisdiction 
after the tribe’s activities reached outside the confines of the reservation); 
see also Organized Village of Kake v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 75 (1962).  
The High End Hotel’s commercial cannabis activities reached far beyond 
the M-A Nation’s reservation. Michiconsin residents are enticed to travel 
onto the M-A Nation’s reservation, buy cannabis that is illegal in all other 
parts of the state, and use it off the reservation. The injuries incurred were 
suffered and will continue to be suffered in the state of Michiconsin, not 
merely in the boundaries of the reservation. Michiconsin has a strong 
interest in interjecting itself into this suit because the victims of The High 
End Hotel’s actions are Michiconsin residents and the effects of the 
cannabis enterprise are felt in Michiconsin. Because of Michiconsin’s 
substantial interest in hearing this case, and the lack of federal law to the 
contrary, Michiconsin state courts have adjudicatory jurisdiction in this 
matter.  
Additionally, there is little question the Michiconsin courts have personal 
jurisdiction over the MAIN EDC and High End Hotel because the entities 
are incorporated within its borders. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 
Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
Therefore, the only question left is whether the Michiconsin courts can 
apply common law state tort doctrine. 
2. Michiconsin law is not pre-empted by federal law or tribal interests of 
self-determination and self-government reflected in federal law. 
The first step in determining whether state law is pre-empted by federal 
law is determining whether there is a federal regulatory scheme in place. 
See Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 341. To determine whether a 
federal regulatory scheme exists, this Court must look “to the applicable 
treaties and statutes which define the limits of state power.” McClanahan v. 
Ariz. Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973). Here, there is no applicable 
treaty or statute which deprives Michiconsin courts of jurisdiction to apply 
its common law tort doctrine. Furthermore, this is within the scope of 
Michiconsin’s state power because providing a tort remedy is one of the 
most basic and traditional state functions.  
Next, the Court must consider whether state authority is pre-empted by 
tribal interests reflected in federal law. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 
at 334. In other words, as long as the state law does not interfere with 
federal goals of tribal self-government and self-determination, the state law 
is not pre-empted. Id.  
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In Rice, this Court considered whether state interests in regulating liquor 
sales were pre-empted by interests in Indian self-governance. 463 U.S. 713. 
In holding that the state had authority to apply its law, the Court 
emphasized that tribal liquor regulation was not a “fundamental attribute of 
sovereignty.” Id. at 722. According to this Court, “tradition simply has not 
recognized a sovereign immunity or inherent authority in favor of liquor 
regulation by Indians.” Id.  
Similarly, manufacturing and distributing a dangerous and quasi-illegal 
substance cannot be said to be a fundamental attribute of sovereignty. There 
is no tradition of permitting tribes to create and sell cannabis when it is 
illegal elsewhere in the state. Further, “because of the lack of tradition of 
tribal self-government” in the area of distributing drugs, “it is not necessary 
that Congress indicate expressly that the State has jurisdiction.” See id. at 
731. Therefore, The High End Hotel’s tortious use of carcinogenic 
pesticides on cannabis that injured Michiconsin residents falls outside of the 
M-A Nation’s interests in self-government and within Michiconsin’s 
interests in protecting its residents. Thus, Michiconsin has jurisdiction to 
apply its common law tort doctrine. 
3. Michiconsin’s interest in providing recourse for tort victims justifies 
assertion of state authority. 
Finally, the Court should consider if there are state interests in “off-
reservation effects that warrant State intervention.” Mescalero Apache 
Tribe, 462 U.S. at 342; see also Rice, 463 U.S. at 725. A state’s interest will 
be “particularly substantial if the state can point to off-reservation effects 
that necessitate State intervention.” Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. at 
336; see also Rice, 463 U.S. at 725 (finding that the state had an interest in 
the spillover effect from on-reservation liquor sales). 
Michiconsin’s interest in preventing off-reservation effects of cannabis 
necessitates applying its common law tort doctrine in this case. As in Rice 
where the Court noted that the state had an “unquestionable interest in the 
liquor traffic that occur[ed] within its borders,” Michiconsin has an 
unquestionable interest in providing recourse for its citizens harmed by the 
dangerous effects of burning cannabis. See Rice, 463 U.S. at 724. There is 
no question that cannabis sold on the reservation will easily find its way 
into the hands of Michiconsin citizens off the reservation. The High End 
Hotel has created a pocket for an otherwise illegal enterprise that will 
attract tribal members and nonmembers alike, and the tortious effects from 
burning the cannabis for a recreational high will have a substantial impact 
across the state of Michiconsin. Furthermore, Michiconsin has a strong 
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interest in deterring the use of carcinogenic pesticides on products that will 
inevitably be burned by consumers. Therefore, the state’s interests in 
applying its tort law to recompense victims outside the reservation are 
implicated in such a way that state authority is justified. See Hicks, 533 
U.S. at 362. Accordingly, the judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Michiconsin should be reversed. 
Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, the Michiconsin Supreme Court’s judgment in 
People of Grant County v. Tribal Chairperson Nimkee Chippewa et al. 
should be affirmed and the Michiconsin Supreme Court’s judgment in 
Michiconsin v. The High End Hotel should be reversed. 
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